The Fall of the Roman Republic, and the Rise of Augustus

12/8/20

The air is awash with screams. Red stains the pearly blue of the Mediterranean, splintered wood and broken spears floating amidst the carnage. Carcases and drowning men cluster around the great ships, which rear against one another in a thunderous rage. A sight to behold, the deciding moment in a hundred-year struggle. He stands at the prow of his warship, watching as the enemy fleet breaks. He has won. His father is avenged. The Senate is his. The people are his. The ultimate triumph, a victory which will give him more power than any Roman has ever had. The country rests in his hands, for him to shape, to guide. He will remake the world. This is his twelfth year of war, and thirty-third year of life [3].

                Such was the day at Actium, when young Caesar shattered Antony’s fleet and ended the civil wars. Four years later, he returned to Rome and became the “first citizen,” Princeps.  The Senate conferred upon him the title Augustus (revered), by which he would be remembered. The military and legislative supremacy that Augustus achieved marked the end of the Roman republic and the rise of the Empire. Many lamented this shift, arguing that the Republic was representative of Rome’s most glorious properties, inciting absolute loyalty to the state, and a stability which could not be achieved through Monarchy [1]. However, the century of Civil Wars leading up to Actium might suggest otherwise. The conflicts put Rome in a precarious state, altering essential structures in government and business [2]. The military in particular was transformed in a manner that gave individual figures inordinate amounts of power [7]. These factors contributed to the complete collapse of democratic functions, and helped carve Augustus’ path to supremacy. His triumph was further induced by conflict amidst the oligarchic ruling body of the Republic known as the Senate, which was destined to fail due to its lack of diverse representation and the increasing desire for prominence among the Senators themselves. While he was extremely intelligent, a gambler with immense cunning, Augustus’ eventual victory was more the result of Fortuna’s favor than his own military prowess or political acumen [1]. In war, his actions were often aggressive and poorly organized, many victories resulting from the divide between the growing scales of the conflicts and the outdated forms of intelligence gathering and communication rather than his abilities as a general.

Augustus’ meteoric rise began long before his birth, caused by decay in the existing governing body known as the Senate. In the waning years of the Republic, the Senate became increasingly obsessed with the continued dominance of the aristocratic class--namely themselves--which perverted the original republican principles.  The republic was meant to benefit all citizens of Rome. not just a small class. The first obvious sign of decay was in 133 B.C.E, with the murder of the Tribune Tiberius Gracchus, about 70 years before the birth of Augustus. Gracchus was a Tribune to the plebs, and his job was to guard the people’s interests within the Senate [10]. He wished to pass a measure which redistributed land to those under a certain wealth echelon, to stimulate economic growth amongst the lower classes. In the late years of the second century B.C.E, more and more individuals of low birth, from outside of the Patriciae and Equestrian families (the traditional ruling class in Rome) were gaining elected positions. Thus, many members of the powerful families were growing worried about the possibility of losing their powerful influence over the state. Furthermore, men like Gracchus wished wealth to be more evenly distributed, further curbing the power of the old families. Many clans held much of their influence over the common folk through the patronage system, through which lesser families were financially dependent upon the wealthier ones, in exchange for loyalty and a vow of service. Gracchus, with his proposed distribution, intended to give the lesser families more agency in this relationship, meaning more bargaining power with the possibility of less debt chaining them to a single property. The Senate recognized this, and beat him to death and murdered 300 of his followers. Gracchus’ death was the first political murder in the history of the Republic, evidence that the Senate was slowly turning away from traditional Republican principles of Libertas, and becoming increasingly concerned with matters of wealth and power [10]. Traditionally, Romans saw such an act as unforgivable. What had changed by Gracchus’ time is that there had been a long period of national security, during which Rome faced no direct threat. Thus, individuals within the Senate became increasingly enamored with personal wealth and power, for they had the time to pursue such things [10].  The murder set a precedent, that of harming the state for the possibility of political and monetary gain. 12 years later, his brother, Caius Gracchus was serving as the Tribune of the Plebs, pursuing similarly liberal measures. He died fleeing Rome under threat of the same fear incurred by his brother [10].

As the Senate became increasingly distant from the people, the military was dramatically reformed, in a way that directly led to the fall of the Republic. At the turn of the first century B.C.E, the Republic was in a state of turmoil. The state was engaged in war against the Numidian King Jugurtha, which by the time of 107 B.C.E, had been ongoing for 5 years. Up until this time, the central government, namely the Senate, was responsible for the salaries of individual legionnaires,  which at the time, were mostly land-owning citizens with the ability to pay for their own arms [5]. This system made it more difficult to field larger numbers of men, as it allowed for only a small portion of the population to engage in military conflict. As the scale of the Jugurthine war expanded, it became clear that the bureaucratic stagnation within the Senate prevented the Republic from fielding men quickly enough, as fielding more legions required large sums from the treasury. Thus enters Marius, the Roman General engaged with Jugartha. His decisions to reform the army came in large part from the obvious flaws in the current system, not so much with the intent to increase the power of individual generals [7]. The most important aspect of his reforms was that individual generals became responsible for the payment of armies. This shifted loyalty of the legions away from the Senate towards individual figures, which proved to have enormous consequences for the Republic. Political influence shifted from subtlety and popular opinion towards the amount of legions under a single person's control [5]. The Senate’s failure to recognize these monumental changes was due in large part to their focus on their own positions, and their increasing dismissal of the need to compensate the legionnaires in proportion to the magnitude of their continued service.

The changes instituted by the reforms, along with the instability within the Senate, led to Civil War. Because of the increased power that generals now held, individuals could make demands of the state which could go unchallenged. Loyalty to the state had always come foremost in the minds of all Republicans. Absolute military power corrupted both Marius and Sulla, who both abused the influence granted to them through their legions to cement their positions of near absolute power. Marius, due to his own reforms, now possessed the loyalty of his Army, and thus marched on Rome. He had been previously exiled, at the behest of Sulla. Killing 100 senators, he set the precedent of using force upon the Republic itself to take control, harming fellow statesmen with the eye of political gain [2]. Marius died soon after, leading to Sulla’s return to Rome, during which he employed similar methods to his enemy, killing those who had professed loyalty to Marius, and reviving the dictatorial powers for himself. This conflict divided Rome further, casting aside many of the powerful families who had sided with Marius. One of these was the Julii, whose Patriarch, Gaius Julius Caesar, had allowed his daughter to marry Marius. He died suddenly, leaving his 16 year old son as head of the family.

How did Julius Caesar change the government in a way that further destabilized the traditional government? The elder Caesar’s rise was due in large part to the factors which allowed Sulla and Marius so much influence. Political factions now held dominant sway within the Senate, and generals with armies often controlled these factions. He became known as a champion of the people, often pushing for land reform within the Senate and throwing frequent banquets and celebrations for the public to enjoy. The adulation of the people was a cornerstone of his power. This was incredibly important. The Senate’s increasingly lack of engagement with the common people, both through legislation, and public displays of appreciation, allowed certain politicians to turn the tide of their favor away from the state as a whole. Caesar further abused this power by allying himself with Pompey and Crassus, forming the first Triumvirate. As the three most powerful men and Rome, possessed of the most wealth and military strength, they freely distributed provinces among themselves, and passed legislation of their choosing. Traditionally, the Republican government consisted of the Senate, which was a body of individuals who elected two Consuls to rule for a year. The Consuls would have the powers to propose reforms, and lead armies, but the Senate would still have the power to make decisions, and curb those of the Consuls. The First Triumvirate altered this structure in that they were able to consolidate large bodies of the Senate around their personal leanings, to the point that if they wanted something, the Senate would give it to them. This blatant perversion of democratic process was a key political tool of Augustus in his early political years in Rome, and it in large part allowed him to siphon power away from the other public offices, and eventually the Senate as a whole.

The Triumvirate quickly dissolved, and Caesar famously crossed the Rubicon river, and marched on Rome. This action was in large part due to his growing discontentment with the Senate, which since the murder of Gracchus, had become increasingly obsessed with its own power, to the detriment of Rome at large [9]. Sulla and Marius had shown power of change which could be held with an army at one’s back. The actions of these two generals, along with the decay within the Senate itself, had led to a slow abandonment of traditional republican principles, to the point where Caesar did not even consider setting aside his armies. The fact that the legions possessed such loyalty to their commander, that they were willing to march upon their home, is further evidence of the Marian reforms granting inordinate power, and the chasmic divide between the common folk of Rome, and the higher ruling bodies. Caesar took Rome, destroyed Pompey at Pharsalus, and proclaimed himself dictator for life [9].

The absolute power that Caesar gave himself led to a group of conspirators within the Senate, following the precedent set by the murder of Gracchus almost a century earlier, stabbing Caesar 23 times upon the senate floor. More than returning the Republic to its state of former glory, this plunged Rome into chaos. The people’s love of the Dictator led them to turn upon the Senate, many of whom had condoned the act. Their terrible mistake was in misjudging the power of popular perception. In their infighting, and obsession with personal gain in terms of political advancement, the Senate had developed a relative disregard for public opinion, not believing the people to hold much sway over the tectonic shifts within the Republic. This proved terribly mistaken. The chaos increased the power of individual figures by incredible magnitudes, as they represented stability, mostly by way of military force.

A significant aspect of Caesar’s legacy was in his will, where he named his grand-nephew as his heir, and gave him his name. It is into this chaos that Caius Julius Caesar emerges. When examining his path to power, the sheer magnitude of contributing factors which occurred before his arrival onto the political stage is now clear. The Senate had begun to destroy itself with the murder of Gracchus, dismissing the welfare of the general population in favor of holding on to their own monies and political influence. The Marian reforms allowed individuals to possess incredible military power, beyond the jurisdiction of any democratic body. And of course, the two successive Civil Wars had plunged the state into further chaos, while also providing justification for military action on the state itself, allowing individual figures to levy the power granted by the Marian reforms to the greatest extent. The Republic was dying, if not already dead, by the time the Young Augustus entered the political arena.

The first legacy of the past century that the Young Caesar takes advantage of is the military structure instituted by the Marian reforms. Because the state was no longer directly responsible for payment of legions, many of Caesar’s veterans, at the time of his death, were left stranded. Thus, the Young Caesar promised them payment, and recruited the 35th and the 7th in Apollonia [8]. These legions were composed of professional soldiers, and were closely bonded due to their continued years of service together. This made them impressive units, incredibly loyal to Julius Caesar. And they gave the Young Caesar power.

However, even though the Senate was in a state of relative disrepair, he still needed their legitimacy to advance his political career. They were still the controlling power in Rome, and the Young Caesar did not yet have such grand designs to use his military strength as Sulla, Marius, or his father had done [1]. So, he needed an ally amongst the Senatorial elite. Interestingly, it was famous orator Cicero, a traditional Republican who had himself risen from nothing, who endorsed the young warlord. The Senator was at first only intent upon “[keeping] an eye on him.” [1] Yet, he later used the boy as a tool against Antony, whom he held a deep hatred for [1]. It was through Cicero that the Young Caesar took advantage of the other legacy from the preceding century, namely the political decay of the Senate which began with Gracchus. There was fear in the Senate that Antony would turn his own legions on the state in the aftermath of Julius Caesar’s death. In response, at the behest of Cicero, they willingly gave power to the Young Caesar, and legitimized all his claims and imperium over his legions. Antony now held an army at Mutina, and the Senate tasked the young General and the two Consuls Hirtius and Pansa with bringing him to heel. They won the battle, and to the enormous luck of Augustus, both of his fellow consuls died, leaving him control over a massive army [4].

Augustus’ direct military actions often faced terrible odds, and resulted in victories as a result of sheer luck and the incompetencies of his opponents. It was a massive gamble to participate in the battle of Mutina in the first place, because his legions, even with the two consuls, were vastly outnumbered. Furthermore, the three armies had little experience fighting alongside one another, whereas Antony’s was made up of veterans who had fought together for many years [1]. After the victory, he betrayed the Senate, another bold decision, allying himself with Marcus Lepidus (another warlord veteran of Caesar) and Antony, who had survived the previous battle. In this situation, he was depending upon the willingness of Antony, who he had just defeated, to ally with him against the Senate, and exert control united through military force. Antony could have easily rejected this olive branch, abandoning the Young Caesar to the Senate [11].  But luck was on his side. Again, the Young Caesar followed a precedent previously set. Following his father’s footsteps, he formed a Triumvirate, a balance of three powers who could control the factions within the Senate [4].

Due to their vast military reach, and the fractures within the existing governing bodies, the Triumvirs could push through whatever legislation they wanted, and thus divided the Empire amongst themselves. They held command of virtually all of the active legions near and around Rome herself, which is what eliminated the power of the Senate [6]. By holding power as a trio, they wished to ensure that no one stepped out of line, for fear of the other two turning uniting their armies in opposition. To consolidate their power, the Triumvirate followed in the footsteps of Sulla and Marius, enacting the Proscriptions, a list of names to be butchered for a reward. Many of the names on the list were from the Senatorial elite, the old power in Rome. By casting aside such individuals, the Triumvirate removed any potential threat to their dominance, eliminating most of those with the ability to raise an army or exude any influence over the politics of the state, including Cicero himself.

By this point, the Republic had all but been destroyed. Power rested in the hands of three individuals, in the form of the Second Triumvirate. The key difference from the First Triumvirate was in their relationship with the Senate, which was far more blatant in dominating the remaining members [6]. All decisions passed directly through them, along with the allotment of every province within the Empire. Almost immediately after their union, they set about destroying the remaining conspirators, namely Brutus, Cassius, and Cato the Younger. At Phillipi, Young Caesar and Antony destroyed both Brutus and Cassius, prompting Cato to commit suicide [1]. In this victory, fortune again seemed to rest in Young Caesar’s favor. A massive miscommunication resulted in Cassius committing suicide, believing Brutus to be lost, which left the remaining conspirator to fight alone.

Augustus’ direct involvement in his rise, namely his military action, is of far less importance to understanding the fall of the Republic than the factors previously described, because the Young Caesar was no great general, as evident by the disorganization and luck which so often played massive roles in his victories [8]. Due to the chaos of the period, and the lack of communication that persisted in battles of such large scale, military skill was actually less important than blatant aggression. If Cassius had maintained an accurate line of communication with his companion, it is certainly possible that Antony and the Young Caesar would have been defeated, due to the fact that the Young Caesar overextended his legions towards Cassius’ forces, in an attempt to end the battle quickly [1]. If Cassius had known the truth of Brutus’ fate, and held firm, perhaps he could have pushed his forces towards the gap, and eventually would have met up with the rest of the army near the Young Caesar’s camp [1]. If the battle had been lost, it is likely that either the Young Caesar would have fallen in battle, or would have been brought to justice under a reinstated Republic, for the crimes of the proscriptions. He only escaped such a fate due to the lack of communication amongst the enemy forces, which was incredibly common in the ancient world [11].

This fact further brings to prominence the importance of the other factors previously described, namely the chaos within the Senate and their poor relationship with the common folk. His relative lack of military experience and intuition was again apparent in Sicily, with the emergence of Sextus Pompeius, son of Pompey, who managed to gain control of the eastern mediterranean with his fleet. It was Agrippa who destroyed the son of Pompey Magnus, and gained Young Caesar control of the seas in the East.

                The alliance between the Triumvirs quickly collapsed, with Lepidus being more or less pushed out of the picture. Antony had his famous romantic soiree with Cleopatra, and Young Caesar moved upon Antony’s fleet at Actium.

                This battle is often seen as the moment of greatest military triumph for Augustus, as it was here that his absolute power was cemented by the death of his final enemy. That his greatest victory was incumbent upon the failures of his enemy, rather than his own military prowess, is integral to understanding the nature of his rise. Antony’s fleet broke, in large part due to the surprising retreat of Cleopatra's forces, which was mostly because of miscommunication [1]. She believed Antony’s fleet to be lost, due to the extended advance of the Young Caesar’s forces, when they were just a thin curtain covering the main brunt of his attack. This overextension was not an intentional military maneuver, but rather an aggressive push by which the Young Caesar wished to end the battle early [1]. Of course, stranded from supporting forces, Antony’s ships quickly lost all organization, and Antony himself was forced to flee with his lone warship. This instance is further evidence of the idea that the communication lines within armies of the time had not yet caught up with the scale at which these conflicts were being fought, which  allowed victory through brutish aggression rather than careful strategy.

                Shortly after his defeat, Antony committed suicide, followed quickly by his lover. This battle made the young Caesar the unrivaled master of Rome. The Young Caesar became the “father to his country,” the divine Augustus. He received absolute power over the military and the ability to make any appointments of his choosing, which virtually gave him absolute power over all legislation in the Senate.

                When examining these events, the pattern of chaos which led to the Empire began far before Augustus. The battle at Actium was made possible mostly through the actions of the Senate in the preceding years, which led to the rise of individual power through the Marian reforms. Within all men, especially those in the Senate, there was an ambition to achieve glory and prominence for one’s family. However, the only way to do so was through service to the state. That idea began to change, with the murder of Gracchus, until personal gain became completely separated from the welfare of the state. Those men who perverted the Republican principles through Civil War and conquest did so only because the current system allowed it. The Senate, who professed such loyalty to traditional democracy, had permitted wealth and power to blind them to the impending destruction of the Republic.

Augustus himself emerged at just the right time, inheriting the perfect legacy, with the popularity of his fathers name and his legions. He was no great general, often over extending his legions and leaving them vulnerable. His victories were heavily reliant on the outdated modes of intelligence gathering and communication lines which could not keep up with the growing scales of conflict of the late first century B.C. His aggression and ruthlessness were effective in that they caused further havoc, with unintended success. Many others could have achieved ultimate supremacy during this time, due to the fractures in the Senate, and the uncontrollable factors which plagues most battles. The state of Rome itself was heading towards a monarchy. Individual power was a path to stability, for too many men had too much individual power, and all were willing to use it. In the end, the only way to ensure that two warlords did not lead their armies upon one another was for one general to destroy all others, for a person to stand unrivaled. Augustus was a solution, a path to peace. But the first royal line of Rome could have easily been an Antonian dynasty, rather than the Julio-Claudian one that emerged.

Bibliography:

[1] Adrian Goldsworthy. Augustus: First Emperor of Rome. Yale University Press, 2015

[2] Beard, Mary. SPQR: A History of Ancient Rome. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2015.

[3] Fratantuono, Lee. The Battle of Actium 31 BC: War for the World. Pen and Sword Military, August 5, 2016.

[4] Suetonius. The Twelve Caesars. A. S. Kline 2010

[5] Alston, R 2003, 'The Role of the Military in the Roman Revolution', Aquila Legionis, vol. 3, pp. 7-41.

[6] James Ermatinger. "ILS 77 and 78: The End of the Second Triumvirate." Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte 42, no. 1 (1993): 109-10. Accessed November 21, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436274.

[7] Luce, T. J. "Marius and the Mithridatic Command." Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte 19, no. 2 (1970): 161-94. Accessed November 19, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4435129.

[8] RICH, J. W. "Augustus, War and Peace." In Augustus, by Edmondson Jonathan, 137-64. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014. Accessed November 13, 2020. doi:10.3366/j.ctvxcr9zc.13.

[9] Taylor, Lily Ross. "The Rise of Julius Caesar." Greece & Rome 4, no. 1 (1957): 10-18. Accessed November 16, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/641006

[10] Yakobson, Alexander. “Traditional Political Culture and the People’s Role in the Roman Republic.” Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte 59, no. 3 (2010): 282-302.

Accessed November 16, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25758311

[11] Syme, Ronald. The Roman Revolution, London. New York : Oxford University Press, 1960.